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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DONALD L. HURLBURT, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs . 
JOHN A. GULLO and ROSETTA 
FOOTE, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
) Case No. 860135 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The following issues of law are presented within the 
brief of Appellant: 
(1) Was the Plaintiff's oral notice of his election 
to exercise the five-year extension option within the April 
18, 1983 lease agreement a violation of controlling statute 
of frauds provisions governing real estate transactions? 
(2) Did the April 18, 1983 handwritten lease 
agreement evidence specific mutual party intent so that it 
is capable of enforcement? 
(3) Did each Defendant have both actual and 
constructive notice of the April 18, 1983 written lease 
notwithstanding that the lease was not recorded or a 
similar notice of interest was not recorded in the Office 
of the Weber County Recorder? 
(4) Can the Plaintiff establish damages which will 
permit a judgment to enter in favor of Plaintiff and 
against each Defendant? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff commenced this action after the Defendant 
Foote sold to the Defendant Gullo the real property covered 
by the April 18, 1983 handwritten lease agreement made 
between the Plaintiff and the deceased husband of the 
Defendant Foote. The Defendant Gullo assumed immediate and 
exclusive possession of the subject real property thereby 
terminating the balance of the Plaintiff's leasehold 
interest . 
Plaintiff's Complaint alleges damages against each 
Defendant for the the value of improvements which he made 
to the real property, for overhead costs and for prospect-
tive damages based upon lost profits. The Defendants 
jointly filed a Motion to Dismiss and alternative Motion 
for Summary Judgment following the completion of pre-trial 
discovery within which interrogatories were served upon and 
answered by Plaintiff and in which the depositions upon 
oral examination were taken of the Plaintiff and of each 
Defendant. The Defendants1 alternative motion against the 
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Plaintiff alleged the multiple grounds that: 
(1) The April 18, 1983 handwritten lease was so 
vague, unspecific and ambiguous that it did not constitute 
a valid and enforceable lease, 
(2) No meeting of the minds occurred between the 
Plaintiff and the named Defendants which would constitute 
an enforceable lease, 
(3) No notice of interest or other recording was 
made against the subject real property so that each 
Defendant never acquired actual or constructive notice of 
the lease agreement, 
(4) The Plaintiff cannot establish damages. 
The trial court ordered Summary Judgment in favor of 
each Defendant and against Plaintiff for the reason that 
the Plaintiff's oral notice of his election to exercise the 
five year extension option within the handwritten lease 
violated the statute of frauds, UCA §25-5-1 (1953, as 
amended). The lease was accordingly held to be a year to 
year lease which the Defendant Gullo lawfully terminated 
without damgages to the Plaintiff. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The events and circumstances at issue in this action 
are focused on an April 18, 1983 handwritten lease document 
signed by Mr. Hurlburt and Mr. Donald C. Foote, the 
deceased husband of the Defendant, Rosetta Foote. Mr. 
Foote died May 27, 1984. (Foote dep. at 4, Ex. 2) The 
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April 18, 1983 lease agreement identifies an approximate 
five acres of real property with water rights located at 
1805 W. 400 N., Slaterville, Utah. (Foote dep, Ex. 2) The 
identified real property is that acreage which was then 
owned by Mrs. Foote and her husband in joint tenancy. 
(Foote dep. at 6) The property and the residential home 
located on it had been acquired by the Footes in 1961. 
(Foote dep. at 5) From the inception of the Footes1 own-
ership, the property has had located on it a home and a 
garden extending approximately fifty feet from the rear of 
the home. The balance of the property, consists of approx-
imately three and one-half acres. (Foote dep. at 4) This 
three and one-half acres has been continuously separated 
from the home and garden by an old fence and a ditch which 
traverse the property on an east/west line. The right-of-
way fence for Interstate 15 forms the southern boundary of 
the property with the east and west side boundaries simi-
larly fenced. (Foote dep. 4, 11) The three and one-half 
acre parcel to the south of the home had been used for 
farming by the Footes throughout their twenty-two year 
ownership of the property. (Foote dep. at 5) The 
configuration of this three and one-half acres, to include 
the perimeter boundary fences and the location of the 
irrigation ditch, have remained unchanged throughout the 
Footes1 ownership of the property. (Foote dep. at 5, 
11-12) The Footes had likewise acquired with their 
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ownership of this approximate five acre parcel of property, 
two and one-half shares of irrigation water representing 
approximately one hour of irrigation time. (Foote dep. 
16-17) 
Mr Hurlburt met with the Footes at their home during 
the first part of April 1983 to negotiate for his lease of 
the approximate three and one-half acres located behind and 
to the south of the Foote home. (Foote dep. 10-11) Mr. 
Hurlburt wanted to lease the property to obtain additional 
hay production for livestock owned by him as well as to 
generate income through the sale of hay not required for 
his own livestock purposes. (Hurlburt dep. at 13) The 
Footes were receptive to Mr. Hurlburtfs offer for the 
reason that the three and one-half acres had not been 
farmed for the previous four years, Mr. Footefs health 
would not allow him to resume farming operations and Mr. 
Hurlburtfs use of the property would upgrade it. (Foote 
dep. at 10-11; Hurlburt dep. at 13) The Footes asked Mr. 
Hurlburt to prepare a written lease agreement to raemoralize 
the essential aspects of the lease transaction, to provide 
for Mr. Hurlburt to lease the three and one-half acres for 
an initial one year term payable in an annual instalment of 
$150.00 with an option to lease the real property for an 
additional five year term upon the same terms and condi-
tions. (Foote dep. at 14-15: Hurlburt dep. at 21-22) The 
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Footes advised Mr. Hurlburt that the home and the garden 
area behind the home were excluded from the lease. 
(Hurlburt dep. at 22) Mr. Hurlburt returned to the Foote 
home on April 18, 1983 with a handwritten lease agreement 
which had been prepared between him and his wife. 
(Hurlburt dep. at 21) The lease agreement was reviewed by 
both of the Footes and signed by Mr. Foote at their home 
with Mr. Hurlburt present. Mrs. Foote did not sign the 
lease but no particular or conscious reason exists for why 
she did not. (Foote dep. at 14-15) Mrs. Foote understood 
fully the controlling terms of the lease agreement. (Foote 
dep. at 12, 13, 15-16) Mr. Hurlburt plowed, disked and 
planted oats on the leased property during the Spring of 
1983. (Foote dep. at 18, 10; Hurlburt dep. at 24-26) He 
likewise tendered the $150.00 lease payment for 1983 with a 
$75.00 payment in the Spring and a $75.00 payment in the 
Fall. (Hurlburt dep. at 29; Foote dep. at 19). 
Mr. Hurlburt gave notice of his election to exercise 
the five year lease option in the early Spring months of 
calendar year 1984 at which time Mr. Hurlburt used a land 
plane and tractor on the leased property to level its 
surface and to fill a depression at the south end of the 
property where surface water had previously collected. 
(Hurlburt dep. at 25) Mr. Hurlburt then disked the leased 
property, prepared it for planting and drilled it with an 
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alfalfa-oats combination. (Hurlburt dep. at 25-27) Mrs. 
Foote received from Mr. Hurlburt during that spring the 
scheduled $75.00 lease payment (Foote dep. at 19) Mr. 
Foote died on May 27, 1984. (Foote dep. at 4) Following 
Mr. Footefs death, Mr. Hurlburt met with Mrs. Foote and 
paid to her the remaining $75.00 for the 1984 lease payment. 
(Foote dep. at 21-22) Mrs. Foote at that time committed to 
Mr. Hurlburt that he should continue to farm the property. 
(Foote dep. at 21) Mrs. Foote believed the April 18, 1983 
lease agreement was a valid contract whose terms were 
binding upon her and which vested Mr. Hurlburt with a 
remaining four years to farm the leased property under his 
oral notice of his election to exercise the five year ex-
tension. (Foote dep. at 22) Mr. Hurlburt harvested one 
hay cutting from the leased property during 1984. This 
cutting produced between 200 to 250 bales of hay averaging 
between 60 to 65 pounds per bale. (Hurlburt dep. at 28-29) 
Mr. Gullo approached Mrs. Foote during December 1984 
with a written offer to buy the entire five acre tract. 
(Foote dep. at 23, 25-26) The documents submitted by Mr. 
Gullo did not identify the Hurlburt lease nor did Mrs. 
Foote at that time discuss the Hurlburt lease with Mr. 
Gullo. (Foote Dep. at 26) Mrs. Foote did not act upon the 
December 1984 purchase offer made by Mr. Gullo other than 
to review the documents with her immediate family. (Foote 
dep. at 26) Mr. Gullo next met with Mrs. Foote at her home 
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during the early part of April 1985 with a second written 
offer to purchase the entire five acres. (Foote dep. at 
19) Mrs. Foote then informed Mr. Gullo of the Hurlburt 
lease and that four years remained under its five year 
option term. (Foote dep. at 30). Mrs. Foote did not 
specifically identify the April 18, 1983 lease agreement 
nor did she produce a copy of it for Mr. Gullo. (Foote 
dep. at 30) Mrs. Foote's position with Mr. Gullo was that 
the Hurlburt lease was a binding commitment upon her which 
had to be acknowledged within any sales transaction for her 
property (Foote dep. at 27, 30) Mr. Gullo then informed 
Mrs. Foote that he would either honor the Hurlburt lease or 
make appropriate restitution. (Foote dep. at 30-31) 
Mr. Hurlburt met with Mrs. Foote at her home during 
April 1985 and following Mr. Gullo's April 1985 purchase 
offer to Mrs. Foote. (Hurlburt dep. at 30) Mr.. Hurlburt 
tendered the spring 1985 $75.00 payment which payment Mrs. 
Foote did not take because of her pending sales negotiatins 
with Mr. Gullo. (Hurlburt dep. at 30, 32)) Mr. Hurlburt 
then inquired if she had informed Mr. Gullo of the lease to 
which Mrs. Foote replied that she had informed Mr. Gullo of 
Mr. HurlburtTs lease and that Mr. Gullo had informed her 
that he would either honor the lease or buy it. (Hurlburt 
dep. at 33) Mr. Hurlburt thereafter unsuccessfully 
attempted to telephone Mr. Gullo. Similarly, Mr. Hurlburt 
received no communication from Mr. Gullo. (Hurlburt dep. 
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at 33) 
Mr. Hurlburt again met with Mrs. Foote at her home 
during the last week of April 1985 to further inquire about 
the progress of the sales negotiations btween her and Mr. 
Gullo. (Hurlburt dep. at 37) Mrs. Foote stated that she 
had committed to sell the entire five acre tract, that the 
sales negotiations were at the closing stage and that funds 
would be disbursed through United Savings and Loan. 
(Hurlburt dep. at 37-39) Mrs. Foote asked Mr. Hurlburt for 
a copy of the April 18, 1983 handwritten lease agreement 
because she had been unable to locate hers. (Hurlburt dep. 
at 37) Mr. Hurlburt provided Mrs. Foote that day with a 
copy of the lease. (Hurlburt dep at 37). Mr. Hurlburt 
likewise went directly to the Gullo home to confer with Mr. 
Gullo but was unable to find anyone at the house. 
(Hurlburt dep. at 38-39) Later that same day, Mr. Hurlburt 
met with the loan disbursing officer at United Savings and 
Loan and there showed him a copy of the April 18, 1983 
lease agreement. (Hurlburt dep. at 40). The loan officer 
informed Mr. Hurlburt that Mrs. Foote would be adivsed not 
to negotiate any portion of the net sale proceeds until the 
status of the Hurlburt lease was resolved. (Hurlburt dep. 
at 37) 
The sale of the Foote property to Mr. Gullo was 
closed on May 2, 1985 at United Savings and Loan. (Foote 
dep. at 7) The closing was attended by Mr. Gullo and Mrs. 
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Foote. The Hurlburt lease was not discussed or identified 
by anyone attending the closing. (Foote dep. at 34) No 
communication occurred between Mr. Gullo and Mr. Hurlburt 
prior to the May 2, 1985 sale closing date. (Hurlburt dep. 
at 31) The closing was not attended by Mr. Hurlburt nor 
was he advised of its date. (Hurtlburt dep. at 37-40) 
Following the May 1, 1985 closing, Mr. Gullo 
informed Mr. Hurlburt by letter that he was assuming 
exclusive possession of the property. Mr. Gullo thereafter 
moved horses onto the three and one-half acres and since 
May 19&5 has asserted exclusive possession. (Hurlburt dep. 
at 34-35) 
Mr. Hurlburt met with Mrs. Foote at her home 
immediately folloiwng Mr. Gullofs placement of horses on 
the property covered by the Hurlburt lease. (Hurlburt dep* 
at 35) Mrs. Foote confirmed that the sale had been 
completed, that the United Savings and Loan loan officer 
had advised her to negotiate her sale check and that Mr. 
Gullo had earlier appeared at her home and informed her 
that all issues surrounding the Hurlburt lease had been 
satisfactorily resolved. (Hurlburt dep. at 34-36), 41) 
But for the identified letter received by Mr. Hurlburt from 
Mr. Gullo, no communication has ever occurred between the 
two men to either resolve or to acknowledge the issues 
presented by the April 18, 1983 lease agreement. (Hurlburt 
dep. at 31-32) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred as a matter of law by holding 
that the Plaintiff's oral notice of his election to exer-
cise the five year option term within the handwritten April 
18, 1983 lease violated the statute of frauds provisions 
within UCA §25-5-1 (1953, as amended). The handwritten 
lease does not require Mr, Hurlburt to exercise in writing 
the five year extension option. Mr. Hurlburtfs oral notice 
of his election to exercise the five year option provided 
for the same performance and payment conditions which had 
controlled the parties during the first year of the lease. 
Case law confirms that a lessee who orally exercises a 
renewal option does not violate the statute of frauds for 
the reason that the lessee holds for the extended term 
under the original lease and not under the notice. 
The April 18, 1983 lease agreement evidences an un-
equivocal mutual intent between two parties for the lease 
of real property. Parol and extrinsic evidence is admiss-
ible to clarify any ambiguity or vagueness within the lease 
agreement to the extent that party intent cannot be reason-
ably ascertained. The handwritten lease does contain 
limited ambiguity in that: (1) the lease agreement 
identifies five acres whereas the leasehold was actually 
confined to three and one-half acres, (2) the lease 
agreement identifies the property by street address and not 
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by legal property description, (3) the lease agreement does 
not define the initial term as one year after which the 
five year extension option could be exercised, and (4) the 
quantity and source of irrigation water for the leased 
property is not identified within the lease agreement. The 
uncontradicted evidence, however, is that Mr. Hurlburt and 
the Foote's clearly and unequivocally understood always 
their mutual rights and obligations. The Defendant Foote 
and her husband each knew that the lease covered only the 
three and one-half acres to the rear of the home which 
acreage had always been marked by the same boundary fences 
and ditch during their entire twenty-two year ownership of 
the property. Each of the Footes and Mr. Hurlburt knew and 
had agreed that the initial lease term was for one year 
with the five year extension option to thereafter apply. 
Similarly, the irrigation water covered by the lease was 
that which the Footes had acquired and used on the property 
throughout their entire ownership tenure. Mr. Hurlburt and 
the Footes performed under the April 18, 1983 written lease 
for two years without interruption, without dispute and 
without any need to clarify their respective rights and 
obligations. Claims of ambiguity and vagueness within the 
written lease were never raised by either Mr. Hurlburt or 
either of the Footes until after Mr. Gullo purchased the 
property in May 1985. Mr. Gullo originated the arguments 
of ambiguity and vagueness. Such arguments ignore that Mr. 
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Gullo had actual knowledge of the existence of the lease 
when he bought the property but that he failed and refused 
to investigate. The Utah Supreme Court has liberally 
allowed parol and extrinsic evidence to ascertain party 
intent where such intent cannot be derived with reasonable 
certainty from the four corners of the writing. The use of 
such parol and extrinsic evidence is proper in this action 
to develop and ascertain fully party intent. 
Immaterial to this action is whether or not the 
April 18, 1983 handwritten lease was recorded or a sim-
ilar notice of interest was recorded in the Office of the 
Weber County Recorder. The terms and conditions of the 
lease are enforceable between Mr. Hurlburt and Mrs. Foote 
because she participated in and approved the lease negotia-
tions, accepted lease payments from Mr. Hurlburt for two 
years to include one year within the five year extension 
option, she confirmed to Mr. Hurlburt that the lease was 
binding upon her following the death of her husband and she 
advised Mr. Gullo that his purchase of the property was 
subject to the Hurlburt lease. Actual notice of the lease 
from Mrs. Foote to Mr. Gullo was sufficient to place Mr. 
Gullo on reasonable notice and to obligate him to further 
investigate the competing interest of Mr. Hurlburt. Mr. 
Gullofs failure or refusal to investigate, as a matter of 
law, does not relieve him from honoring the Hurlburt lease. 
Mr. Hurlburt itemized within his Answers to Interro-
gatories and within his deposition upon oral examination 
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the nature and extent of damages incurred by him from the 
Defendants1 wrongful termination of the lease. The cumu-
lative computation for Mr, HurlburtTs damages exceed twenty 
thousand dollars and derive from overhead costs, investment 
expenditures incurred from his projected six year use of 
the lease property and for lost profit within the balance 
of the leasehold term. The damages sought by Mr. Hurlburt 
are compensatory, are reasonably foreseeable from a breach 
of the parties' lease agreement and cover the types of 




THE PLAINTIFF'S ORAL NOTICE OF HIS ELECTION TO EXERCISE THE 
FIVE YEAR EXTENSION OPTION WITHIN THE APRIL 18, 1983 LEASE 
AGREEMENT WAS NOT A VIOLATION OF CONTROLLING STATUTE OF 
FRAUDS PROVISIONS GOVERNING REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS. 
Mr. Hurlburt gave the Foote's oral notice of his 
intention to exercise the five year extension option during 
the spring of 1984 and prior to the onset of the calendar 
year 1984 farming season. The April 18, 1983 lease 
agreement does not specify how or in what manner Mr. 
Hurlburt was required to provide the Footes with notice of 
his election to extend the lease for an additional five 
year term. The lease agreement does not require written 
notice. Mr. Hurlburt had completed the first year within 
the five year extension term when Mr. Gullo completed his 
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May 2, 1985 purchase of the real property. Mr. Hurlburt 
had further tendered to Mrs. Foote the first instalment for 
the calendar year 1985 lease payment which payment she had 
not accepted because of the then pending sales transaction 
with Mr. Gullo. In awarding Summary Judgment to each of 
the Defendants and against Plaintiff the trial court ruled 
from the bench at the conclusion of oral argument by 
respective counsel as follows: 
My interpretation of the contract is that 
it is a lease for one year with an option 
to renew for five years. Generally the 
law would be that to exercise an option 
for a five year lease, that would have to 
be done in writing or it would be in 
violation of the Statute of Frauds. 
I think the argument under some 
circumstances could be made that part 
performance in furtherance of exer-
cising the five year option would take 
it outside the statute but my under-
standing is the case law would suggest 
that that would be a matter of equity to 
avoid unjust enrichment and would not 
apply in a case like this where you are 
asking enforcement and money judgment. 
• • . 
I think the statute of frauds 
applies. (sic) I don't think the option 
was exercised in writing, and I donft 
think it is enforcible. (sic) 
I will grant the Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. (Addendum to 
Appellant's Brief at 33) 
The trial court erred as a matter of law by holding 
that Mr. Hurlburt's oral notice of his election to exercise 
the five year extension within the handwritten lease 
violated controlling statute of frauds provisions within 
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UCA §25-5-1 (1953, as amended). Case law confirms that a 
lessee who orally exercises his renewal option does not 
violate the statute of frauds for the reason that the 
lessee holds for the extended terra under the original lease 
and not under the notice. The controlling legal standard 
is set forth within an American Law Reports annotation 
captioned, Sufficiency of Notice of Exercise of Option to 
Renew Lease, 51 ALR2d 1404,1407 (1957), as follows: 
Verbal notice of the exercise of an option 
to renew a written lease is generally held not 
to come within the statute of frauds, for the 
reason that the contract between the parties is 
embodied in the original lease, the writing of 
which is sufficient to meet the requirements of 
the statute. And in a proper case, the lessor 
may be estopped from pleading the statute of 
frauds even though the original lease might not 
have complied with the requisite. (citations 
omitted) 
Case law authority confirms that a lesseefs oral 
notice to exercise a renewal or extension option within a 
written lease agreement does not violate controlling 
statute of frauds provisions, especially where the lease 
agreement does not require written notice for the option 
to be exercised: 
Gruber v. Castleberry, 23 Ariz.App. 322, 
533 P2d 82( 1975)(Oral notice of election to exercise 
an option for renewal of a written lease does not 
violate statute of frauds - such result obtains on 
the theory that terms and conditions of the contract 
are embodied in the lease, which is in writing and 
the only effect of the notice is to make the 
original lease operative for the renewal period.) 
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Contintental Builders, Inc. v. Leach, 
625 P2d 5 (Kan.App. 1981)(Oral notice of election to 
exercise option for renewal of written lease does 
not violate statute of frauds.) 
Prince Enterprises, Inc. v. Griffith Oil Co., 
664 P2d 877 (Kan.App. 19«3)(Where renewal of lease 
is upon same terms and conditions as original 
lease, which is in writing, original lease is 
thus embodied in agreement to renew and it 
satisfies written requirement of statute of 
frauds.) 
Kern v. Pawlega, 5 Mich.App. 384, 
146 N.W.2d 689( 1966) (Tenant's oral notification 
of exercise of option to renew lease containing 
provision that tenant had right of lease 
renewal for additional five years, satisfied 
statute of frauds.) 
Ripani v. Liberty Loan Corp. of Carmichael, 
157 Cal.Rptr. 272, 95 C.A.3d 603 (Cal.App.1979) 
(Where original lease with option to renew was 
in writing and properly executed by lessee, 
exercise of option to renew lease did not 
violate statute of frauds inasmuch as origi-
nal lease satisfied statute.) 
Daehler v. Oggoian, 72 111.App.3d 360, 
390 N.E.2d 417 (111.App. 1979)(Unlawful de-
tainer action brought by building owner and 
new tenant against old tenant, testimony 
offered as to oral statement or statements 
used to renew lease through exercise of alleged 
renewal option in original lease was not 
hearsay and did not violate statute of 
frauds and thus such testimony was competent 
to show lessee had exercised his option and 
acquired renewal lease.) 
The writing requirement within the statute of frauds 
provisions of UCA §25-5-1 was not violated by and did not 
vitiate the oral notice provided by Mr. Hurlburt to the 
Footes that he was exercising his option to extend the 
April 18, 1983 lease agreement for a five year term com-
mencing with the Spring of calendar year 1984. 
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POINT 2 
THE APRIL 18, 1983 HANDWRITTEN LEASE AGREEMENT DOES 
EVIDENCE SPECIFIC MUTUAL PARTY INTENT AND IS NOT SO VAGUE, 
UNSPECIFIC AND AMBIGUOUS THAT IT IS INCAPABLE OF 
ENFORCEMENT, 
Defendants urge that the April 18, 1983 lease agree-
ment is vague and uncertain in its essential terms and 
accordingly incapable of enforcement. A corollary of this 
argument is that the mutual intent of the parties cannot be 
ascertained from the language contained within the document 
with the result that a contract was never made. Plaintiff 
concedes that the April 18, 1983 lease agreement does 
contain ambiguous terms. The lease property is identified 
as approximately five acres whereas the Plaintiff!s 
leasehold interest was confined to three and one-half acres. 
Second, the leased property is identified by a street 
address and not by a legal property description. Third, 
the lease agreement does not define the initial terra as one 
year after which the five year extension can be exercised. 
Fourth, the quantity and source of irrigation water is not 
identified within the lease agreement. The uncontradicted 
evidence, however, is that Mr. Hurlburt and the Footes 
clearly and unequivocally understood their mutual rights 
and obligations. Mrs. Foote and her husband knew that the 
Hurlburt lease covered only the three and one-half acres 
located to the rear of the home. This acreage had been 
farmed continuously by the Footes during their twenty-two 
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year ownership of the property and its boundaries had 
always been marked by the same fencing and the lateral 
ditch to the rear of the home. Mrs. Foote similarly 
understood that Hurlburtfs lease would run for an initial 
one year term with an option for a five year extension. 
The Hurlburt lease represented an uncomplicated lease 
agreement made between two rural neighbors for Mr. 
Hurlburtfs farming use of a specific and identifiable piece 
of unimproved real property. The complexities of improved 
real property commerical leasing agreements were never 
present within the transactions between Mr. Hurlburt and 
the Footes and were never considered by either of them. 
The conduct of Mr. Hurlburt and the Footes further confirms 
that the mutual rights and obligations evidenced within the 
April 18, 1983 lease agreement were comprehensively and 
unequivocally understood. Mr. Hurlburt and the Footes 
performed under the terms of the April 18, 1983 lease 
agreement without controversy and without interruption for 
two years. Within the two year period that the lease 
operated, Mr. Hurlburt exercised the five year extension 
option in the Spring of 1984 and neither the Footes nor Mr. 
Hurlburt ever sought a clarification of their mutual rights 
and obligations nor did any disruption or dispute over the 
interpretation of lease rights and obligations ever occur. 
Claims of ambiguity or vagueness within the April 18, 1983 
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lease agreement were never raised by any party to the lease 
until Mr. Gullo purchased the property in May 1985 and 
thereafter determined that Mr. HurlburtTs claims for 
damages were unreasonable and excessive. Mr. GulloTs legal 
argument that the April 18, 1983 lease agreement is 
unenforceable for vagueness and ambiguity fails to 
acknowledge that the parties to the lease agreement 
understood their mutual obligations and interests and 
so conducted themselves for a two year period until Mr. 
Gullo dispossessed Mr. Hurlburt from the leased property in 
May 1985. 
The Utah Supreme Court has liberally allowed the 
admission of parol and extrinsic evidence to ascertain the 
intent of parties to real property convenayces and leases 
where such intent cannot be derived with reasonable 
certainty from the terms of the writing. This rule of law 
has been expressed by the Utah Supreme Court in Coleman v. 
Butkovick, 500 P2d 503, 505 (Utah 1976) as folows: 
It is not to be questioned that in order to 
be valid, a deed must contain a sufficiently de-
finite description to identify the property it 
conveys. (Citations omitted) But the rules which 
are generally applicable to controversies over the 
meaning of documents are also applicable to deeds. 
The problem lies in ascertaining the intent with 
which it was executed. (Citations omitted) It 
should be resolved, if possible, by looking to the 
terms of the instrument itself and any reasonable 
inferences to be drawn therefrom; and if there then 
remains uncertainty of ambiguity it can be aided by 
extrinic evidence. (Citations omitted) If from 
that process the property can be identified with 
reasonable certainty, the deed is not invalid for 
uncertainty. (Citations omitted) 
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The cited rule of law has been further clarified by 
the Alaska Supreme Court in Shilts v. Young, 
567 P2d 769, 773 (Alaska 1977) 
The general rule, however, is that where 
possible, deeds will be made operative and 
the intentions of the parties given effect. 
A deed is not void for uncertainty of de-
scription if the quantity, identity or 
boundaries of the property can be deter-
mined by reference to extrinsic evidence. 
(Citations omitted) Such evidence may 
include parol and subsequent conduct of the 
parties as well as other documents. (Cita-
tions omitted) There appear to be few restric-
tions on the use of extrinsic evidence in 
ambiguous or uncertain deed cases. . . 
The following Utah Supreme Court decisions evidence 
the extent to which the Court has allowed parol and 
extrinsic evidence to clarify ambiguous intent within lease 
documents and related real property conveyance writings: 
Russell v. Valentine, 
14 Utah2d 26,376 P2d 548 (1962) (lease provision 
providing that lessees should have right to renew 
lease "for a further period" rendered the provision 
ambiguous and uncertain - plaintiff allowed to 
introduce extrinsic evidence) 
Davison v. Robbins, 30 Utah 2d 338, 
517 P2d 1026 ( 1973) (oral and extrinsic evidence 
admissible for the purpose of identifying the land 
described and applying the description to the 
property) 
Russell v. Park City Utah Corporation, 
548 P2d 889 (Utah 1976) (ambiguity in language of 
lease as to whether right of first refusal was to 
survive lease's termination - extrinsic and parol 
evidence admitted to determine intention of parties) 
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Corbet v. Cox, 30 Utah2d 361, 517 P2d 1318 (1974) 
(memorandum providing that lessor had received 
"$150,00 for first year lease on lots facing 
main highway in west part of St. George, Utah" 
with a "5-year option to purchase said land for 
the sum of $5,000.00 cash" language deemed to 
be ambiguous - parol and extrinsic evidence 
allowed to determine to which of the three lots 
the lease agreement and option to purchase 
applied) 
Commercial Building Corporation v. Blair, 
565 P2d 776 (Utah 1977) (parol evidence admit-
ted to show intention of parties where language 
of contract may be vague and uncertain - such 
evidence cannot be permitted to vary or con-
tradict plain language of contract) 
Also see, 
Thurman v. Trim, 443 P2d 367 (Kansas 1967) 
(action to enjoin lessors with interfering with 
lessee's use of lease property - lease descrip-
tion encompassed only 200 acres of the 230 acres 
actually owned by lessor - lease description 
further erroneously contained 10 acres not 
owned by lessor and further erroneously omitted 
an additional 50 acres owned by lessor - parol 
evidence was admissible to show the premises 
intended to be demised - parol evidence estab-
lished that parties understood the property 
being leased in spite of the inaccuracy of the 
description in the lease - subsequent party 
performance used to confirm party understanding) 
Any ambiguity and uncertainty present within the 
April 18, 1983 lease agreement can be resolved by parol and 
extrinsic evidence. Parol and extrinsic evidence exist 
within this action to demonstrate that Mr. Hurlburt and the 
Footes clearly and unequivocally understood their mutual 
rights and obligations under the April 18, 1983 lease 
agreement. The result follows that the May 2, 1985 sale of 




EACH DEFENDANT HAD BOTH ACTUAL AND CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF 
THE APRIL 18, 1983 WRITTEN LEASE NOTWITHSTANDING 
THAT THE LEASE WAS NOT RECORDED OR A SIMILAR NOTICE OF 
INTEREST WAS NOT RECORDED IN THE OFFICE OF THE WEBER COUNTY 
RECORDER. 
The Defendants argue that the April 18, 1983 lease 
agreement was not recorded in the Office of the Weber 
County Recorder and that a notice of interest was otherwise 
not recorded evidencing the existence of the lease agree-
ment. They urge that Mr. Gullo bought the property without 
notice of the claims and interests of Mr. Hurlburt. This 
argument misstates the law and the actual notice of the 
Hurlburt lease which was provided to Mr. Gullo by Mrs. 
Foote not less than two weeks in advance of the May 2, 1985 
sale date. The April 18, 1983 lease agreement is not 
legally defective merely because it was not recorded in the 
Office of the Weber County Recorder or a notice of interest 
was otherwise not recorded. The terras and conditions of 
the April 18, 1983 lease are enforceable between Mr. 
Hurlburt and Mrs. Foote. Actual notice of the Hurlburt 
lease provided to Mr. Gullo by Mrs. Foote was sufficient to 
place Mr. Gullo on reasonable notice to further inquire 
into the competing interest of Mr. Hurlburt. Mr. Gullo 
either intentionally or negligently failed to investigate 
or further inquire. Mr. Gullofs failure to act does not 
relieve him from honoring the Hurlburt lease. 
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Tarpey v. Desert Salt Co., 5 Utah 205, 14 P2d 338 (1887) 
(ordinarily a conveyance of land is valid between the 
parties and as to all parties having actual notice thereof 
without being recorded); Gappmayer v. Wilkenson, 
53 Utah 236, 177 P. 763 (1918) (where purchasers of real 
estate had actual notice of adverse of claims of plaintiffs 
as would put reasonable person upon inquiry to ascertain 
what interest was, they took subject to any equities or 
interest that plaintiffs had in premises though such 
interest was not recorded); Latses v. Nick Floor, Inc., 
99 Utah 214, 105 P2d 619 (1940) (actual knowledge - duty to 
inquire). 
Mr. Gullo's May 2, 1985 purchase of the Foote prop-
erty did not displace the Hurlburt lease. Mr. Gullo was 
provided with actual notice of Mr. Hurlburtfs interest with 
actual notice rendering immaterial any legal argument that 
the lease or that a notice of its existence was not 
recorded. 
POINT 4 
PLAINTIFF CAN ESTABLISH DAMAGES WHICH WILL PERMIT A 
JUDGMENT TO ENTER IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF AND AGAINST EACH 
DEFENDANT. 
Mr. Hurlburt has itemized in written form the nature 
and extent of damages incurred by him from the Defendants' 
wrongful termination of the lease. The itemization 
of these damages are fully set forth within Exhibits 1 and 
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2 of Mr. Hurlburtfs September 18, 1985 deposition. The 
cumulative amount of these damages exceed $20,000.00. The 
damages sought by Mr. Hurlburt reflect overhead and invest-
ment expenditures incurred for his anticipated minimum six 
year use of the property and for lost profit. 
The general rule in contract law is that damages 
recoverable for breach are those which arise naturally from 
the breach and which reasonably may be supposed to have 
been within the contemplation of the parties or which are 
reasonably foreseeable. Such damages are essentially com-
pensatory in nature. Robbins v. Finlay, 
645 P2d 625, (Utah 1982); Pacific Coast Title Insurance Co. 
v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 7 Utah 2d 377, 
325 P2d 906 (1958). Likewise, the general objective of 
tort law is to place an injured person in a position as 
nearly as possible to the position he would have occupied 
but for the defendant's wrongful conduct. 
Acculog, inc. v. Peterson, 692 P2d 728 (Utah 1984). The 
Utah Supreme Court has confirmed that overhead costs and 
investment costs are recoverable in either a breach of 
contract action or a business interference action based on 
tort. Miller Pontiac v. Osborne, 622 P2d 800, 
803 (Utah 1981); Acculog, Inc. v. Peterson, 
692 P2d 728 (Utah 1984); Even Odds, Inc. v. Nielson, 
22 Utah 2d 49, 448 P2d 709 (Utah 1968). The Utah Supreme 
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Court has further confirmed that damages for lost profits 
are also recoverable. Penelko, Inc. v. John Price 
Associates, Inc., 642 P2d 1229 (Utah 1982); Acculog, Inc. 
v. Peterson, supra. The recovery of damages for overhead 
and investment expenditures as well as lost profits must be 
based upon evidence that provides a sufficient basis for 
estimating damages with reasonable certainty. Evidence of 
damages is sufficent for proof of lost profits and overhead 
expenditure where the plaintiff provides the best evidence 
available to him under the circumstances. While the 
evidence must not be so indefinite as to allow the jury to 
speculate to the amount of damages, some degree of 
uncertainty is tolerable and anticipated. 
Cook Associates, Inc. v. Warnick, 664 P2d 1161 (Utah 1983); 
Winsness v. M J Conoco Distributors, Inc., 
592 P2d 1303 (Utah 1979); Penelko, Inc. v. John Price 
Associates, Inc., supra. 
The injury and resulting damages which Plaintiff has 
identified are damages which by subject matter and amount 
naturally flow from and are reasonably foreseeable for the 
wrongful termination of the Hurlburt lease. The Defendants 
emphasize that some of Mr. Hurlburtfs damage calculations 
are not derived from contemporaneous business record 
entries. Defendants urge that the Plaintiff's recollection 
of man hours spent and the time to which he committed his 
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machinery and equipment cannot constitute recoverable 
damages absent such business record entries. This argument 
incorrectly equates recollection with speculation. Mr. 
Hurlburtfs deposition isolated specific man hour times 
coupled with specific hourly rate of pay evaluations and 
applied these components to specific activities completed 
by him for the improvement and management of the leased 
property. Such testimony is not speculative. It has 
provided the Defendants with the means to challenge or 
confirm both the nature and extent of the work performed 
and the actual cost or fair value of such work. Mr. 
Hurlburtfs calculation of lost profits is based upon his 
personal farming experience with the production of a hay 
crop and his knowledge of the price at which baled hay is 
sold upon the open market. Mr. Hurlburt confirmed that he 
had anticipated only one hay cutting from the leased 
property during calendar year 1984 but thereafter 
anticipated that the property would yield three to four 
cuttings per year of hay dependent upon weather conditions. 
Mr. Hurlburt provided the Defendants with the basis for his 
calculations that the property would support between 200 to 
250 bales per cutting. Portions of the Plaintiff's damages 
are based upon recollection and calculations not derived 




The February 7, 1986 Order of Summary Judgment 
entered in the District Court of Weber County should be 
reversed with this action remanded for trial on the merits 
DATED this 7th day of October, 1986. 
R e s p e c t f u l l y s<iDmii 
PATTERSON AN$ PATTERSON} 
P H I I I p l c . F|TTERSON~ 
Attorney fo* Appellant 
427 - 27th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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January 15, 1986 HULBERT vs. FOOTE 
1 
2 
THE COURT: My interpretation of the contract is that 
tt is a lease for one year with an option to renew for five years 
i 
3 Generally the lav/ would be that to exercise an option for a 
4 five year lease, that would have to be done in writing or it 













I think the argument under some circumstances could be 
7 made that part performance in furtherance of exercising the five 
3 year option would take it outside the statute, but my understanding 
Is the case lav/ would suggest that that would be a matter of 
tequity to avoid unjust enrichment, and would not apply in a case 
(Like this where you are asking enforcement and money judgment. 
Also it would appear from the facts as presented in your 
lotion, and both Motions, that unjust enrichment wouldn't lie 
Ln this case. The plaintiff simply had the right to use the 
property. He paid a certain amount. He used it, and he reaped 
the benefit of his crop. I don't find that unjust enrichment 
jLs an argument here that can be advanced to get around the statut^ 
I think the statute of frauds applies. I don't think the 
bption was exercised in writing, and I don't think it is 






' I will grant the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
lr. Sabin, you prepare the Finds and Order. 
MR. SABIN: Yes, I will. I will submit it to Mr. 
Patterson for approval as to form. 
THE COURT: Alright. 
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